Sie befinden sich aktuell in den Alexander Kornbrust Oracle Security Blog Blog-Archiven für den folgenden Tag 25 Nov 2009.
- 11g (8)
- Allgemein (27)
- checkpwd (4)
- CPUApril2009 (2)
- CPUJan2009 (3)
- CPUJul2009 (2)
- CPUOct2009 (3)
- David Litchfield (7)
- Exploit (20)
- Forensics (4)
- Oracle Security (79)
- passwords (7)
- SAP (1)
- Security (18)
- Sentrigo (5)
- software (8)
- source code audit (5)
- SQL Injection (23)
- Tools (19)
- Trainings (2)
- Tutorial (2)
- 25 Feb 2010: 2 new ways to create error messages
- 24 Feb 2010: How to Prevent a User Granted the ALTER USER Privilege From Changing SYS/SYSTEM password and how to bypass it
- 23 Feb 2010: New Repscan 3.0 is available
- 22 Feb 2010: Really good whitepaper about "Hacking Oracle from the Web"
- 15 Feb 2010: Interesting Article about SQL Injection in Oracle by Mike Smithers
- 5 Feb 2010: Oracle Blackhat video removed from Website
- 4 Feb 2010: Oracle 11g 0day exploit published
- 30 Jan 2010: Selling stolen bank data to the government for 2.5 Million EUR?
- 6 Dez 2009: Dennis Yurichev wrote an article about his FPGA Oracle password cracker
- 29 Nov 2009: IGHASHGPU - Cracking Oracle Passwords with 790 Million Passwords/second
Oracle Security
Other Blogs
SQL Injection
Trainings
- Februar 2010
- Januar 2010
- Dezember 2009
- November 2009
- Oktober 2009
- September 2009
- August 2009
- Juli 2009
- Mai 2009
- April 2009
- März 2009
- Februar 2009
- Januar 2009
- Dezember 2008
- November 2008
- Oktober 2008
- August 2008
- Juli 2008
- Mai 2008
- April 2008
- März 2008
- Februar 2008
- Januar 2008
- Dezember 2007
- November 2007
- Oktober 2007
- September 2007
- August 2007
- Juli 2007
- Juni 2007
- Mai 2007
Archive für 25 Nov 2009
How Oracle controls access to security vulnerabilities
25 Nov 2009 von Alexander Kornbrust.
Shaomin Wang from Oracle has posted an interesting blog entry “How Oracle controls access to security vulnerabilities“. There are 3 different access types: Default Access, Global Access and Hierarchical Access.
Depending from the role inside of Oracle (e.g. Global Product Security staff, normal employees or their managers) people have the right to view an individual security bug or all security bugs.
This is a big improvement comparing to the time when I was an Oracle employee several years ago. At that time everybody inside of Oracle had access to security bug information.
The only problem nowadays are security bugs which are not marked as security bugs because Oracle support employees are not aware of the security impact of a normal bug. These bugs are often accessible via MyOracleSupport even for Oracle customers.
Geschrieben in Allgemein | Drucken | Keine Kommentare »